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A defining characteristic of intentional communication 
is that it is used socially; that is, an audience is
required for the display of communicative behavior. A second
defining feature of intentional communication is that it
locates objects in time or space for an observer.  Previous
studies of these features of manual gesture in apes have
employed very small samples (one to four subjects).  The
present studies explored (a) the independent effects of the
arrival of an experimenter and food on gestural production
in chimpanzees (N = 35, Experiment 1), (b) the influence of
food dispersion on the number of fingers extended while
pointing (N = 83, Experiment 2), and (c) the effectiveness
of chimpanzees in communicating the location of hidden food
(N = 101, Experiment 3).  The methods employed in these
experiments differ from those used in previous studies in
the following ways: (a) large samples were used, (b) only
first-trial results were analyzed (i.e., every subject
received each experimental condition only once), (c)
“naturalistic” procedures avoided potential confounds with
the effects of novel apparatus or unusual behavior on the
part of the experimenters, and (d) the experiments sampled
from a population of chimpanzees who had not been language-
trained or otherwise raised in intimate association with
humans.  The chimpanzees gestured almost exclusively during
the approach or presence of a human observer (Experiment 1). 
Experiment 2 was inconclusive because too few chimpanzees
pointed.  A human observer was able to correctly guess the
location of a hidden banana on 71% of 97 trials,
demonstrating that chimpanzees can effectively communicate
the location of hidden food without explicit training to do
so.
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This dissertation is dedicated to the late James H.
Kashiwagi (1930-1999), my step-father, with love and
appreciation for his continued belief in my goals, despite
spectacular failures too numerous to list.
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In recent years, pointing behavior has drawn increasing
experimental and theoretical attention from human
developmental researchers, who view pointing primarily in
relation to its significance for the onset of speech (e.g.,
Baldwin, 1995; Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975; Bates,
Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1977; Blake &
Dolgoy, 1993; Butterworth & Grover, 1988; Butterworth, 1991,
2000; Horne & Lowe, 1996; Werner & Kaplan, 1963).  There is
a considerable body of evidence that identifies pointing as
a covariate of verbal labeling (i.e., naming) in the social
environments in which human infants learn to associate
verbalizations with specific objects in the environment. 
Butterworth and Itakura (2000) reported that infants from
six to seventeen months of age followed pointing-to-objects
located further in the periphery from their midlines than
they followed head-turning alone, demonstrating that
pointing serves as a more effective mechanism for the re-
direction of visual attention to peripheral objects than
head-turning alone (similar findings were reported by Deák,
Flom, & Pick, 2000).  Studies by Baldwin and her colleagues
(Baldwin, 1993, 1995; Baldwin & Moses, 1994) have
manipulated the congruence between experimenters’ utterances
and both the experimenters’ and infants’ visual attention,
demonstrating that by 18 months of age, human infants
2
associate verbal labels not with the object at which they
themselves are looking when the verbal label is uttered, but
with a different object, at which the experimenter is
looking when the label is uttered.   Butterworth (2000)
suggested that “pointing . . . authorises visual objects to
take on auditory qualities and this is an early means for
the infant to learn that objects have names” (p. 189).
The production of pointing by human infants has also
been interpreted primarily as a precursor to linguistic
reference.  Some infants begin to point, to direct their
outstretched arm and index finger toward distant objects, by
9 months of age (Figure 1). By 11 to 12.5 months of age,
most infants point (Figure 1) to objects in their
environments and the majority (76% to 88%, depending on the
study) of infant points are accompanied by vocalizations
(Dobrich & Scarborough, 1984; Franco & Butterworth, 1996;
Leung & Rheingold, 1981; Masur, 1983; Zinober & Martlew,
1985). Pointing by human infants is exhibited by the
majority of subjects in diverse experimental or naturalistic
settings by the end of the first year of life, and pointing
is accompanied by high rates of vocal behavior.  Few studies
differentiate these infant vocalizations while pointing into
linguistic versus nonlinguistic categories.  Masur (1983)
found that 25% of all points exhibited by four infants
studied from eight to 18 months of age were accompanied by 
recognizable speech.  Similarly, Zinober and Martlew (1985)
found that 40% of all points exhibited by two infants from
10 to 21 months of age were accompanied by recognizable
speech.  Thus, although pointing by human infants is 
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Figure 1. The development of pointing with concomitant gaze
alternation between objects and social agents in human
infants.  Filled symbols denote pointing without gaze
alternation, whereas hollow symbols denote pointing with
gaze alternation.  The open box shows the age range over
which at least 50% of the infants in each study exhibited
pointing.  The box with diagonal lines shows the age range
over which at least 50% of the infants in each study
exhibited pointing with concomitant gaze alternation between
the object pointed to and social agents.  (Figure is
elaborated from Leavens & Hopkins, 1999, Figure 2b; used
here with permission of the American Psychological
Association.)
frequently accompanied by speech, and serves in these
instances as a paralinguistic gesture, pointing is by no
means exclusively associated with speech.
Pointing is generally characterized as a milestone in a
series of developmental events reflecting increasing
sophistication in the capture and manipulation of the
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behaviors of other social agents (e.g., Adamson, 1996;
Adamson & MacArthur, 1995; Bates et al., 1975; Butterworth,
1991, 2000, in press; Werner & Kaplan, 1963).  Prior to this
watershed, infants’ abilities to enter into states of joint
attention to distal objects with other social agents is
extensively supported by these social agents, usually the
infants’ primary caregivers (Adamson & Bakeman, 1991).  For
example, Bakeman and Adamson (1984) observed infants at
three-month intervals from 6 to 18 months of age in free-
play contexts with their mothers and peers in their homes. 
Of particular interest was how episodes of both the mother
and the infant looking at the same object were coordinated
(“scaffolded”) by the mothers’ behavior.  Bakeman and
Adamson (1984) found that, over the age range studied,
infants’ visual attention to objects was both a significant
antecedent and a consequent of mothers’ actions on these
objects (shaking a rattle, “ringing” a toy telephone, etc.);
in other words, mothers’ object-directed behaviors served to
bring the infants and the mothers into states of joint
attention with these objects long before infants evinced any
capacity for directing the visual attention of others.
After approximately 9 months of age, however, human
infants begin to take an active role in capturing and re-
directing the visual attention of their caregivers and other
social agents (e.g., Bates et al., 1975; Butterworth, 2000,
in press; Desrochers et al., 1995; Lempers, 1979).  This
transition has been variously termed a transition to
“intentional communication” (Bates et al., 1975), to ”robust
triadic joint visual attention” (e.g., Butterworth, in
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press), or to “secondary intersubjectivity” (Trevarthan &
Hubley, 1978).  This biobehavioral shift at approximately 9
months of age is characterized as a new integration of the
abilities (a) to act on objects with (b) the ability to
communicate through gestures with social agents in goal-
directed sequences of activity (Bard, 1992; cf. Sugarman,
1984).
There is a further development that occurs at
approximately 15 months of age: Infants now begin to exhibit
gaze-orienting behavior successively between objects and
social agents as they gesture (Figure 1; Bates et al., 1977;
Desrocher, Morissette, & Ricard, 1995; Lempers, 1979). 
Infants as young as 6 months do successively alternate their
gaze between objects and their social partners (Adamson,
1996; Leavens & Todd, unpublished data), but generally human
infants do not integrate this gaze alternating behavior with
their gestural behavior until much later, typically 13
months of age or later (Figure 1).  Still later, at
approximately 18 months of age, infants begin to look to
their social partners significantly more often prior to
gesturing than during the gesture or after the gesture
(Franco, personal communication, November 23, 2000; Franco &
Butterworth, 1996).  This transition to a pattern of
behavior that integrates gestures with visual orienting to a
social agent is heralded by many developmental researchers
as the canonical marker of intentional communication (e.g.,
Bates et al., 1975, 1977; Petitto, 1988; Tomasello, 1995).
Intentional communication has been variously defined. 
A distinction is offered here between behavioral definitions
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and mentalistic definitions.  An example of a behavioral
definition of intentional communication is that by Bard
(1992): “the ability to coordinate sequences of behavior
involving objects with sequences of behavior involving
social agents” (Bard, 1992, p. 1187; cf. Sugarman, 1984). 
According to this definition, then, intentional
communication is a manipulative capacity that operates in
the social domain.  Numerous positive correlations have been
reported between measures of means-ends abilities (i.e., the
ability to use objects to act on other objects) and various
components of intentional communication, including age at
pointing onset and age at which pointing is accompanied by
gaze alternation (Bates et al., 1977, Bates, Thal,
Whitesell, Fenson, & Oakes, 1989; Bates, Thal, & Marchman,
1991; Harding & Golinkoff, 1979; Sugarman, 1984).  Thus,
according to this definition, intentional communication is a
kind of “social tool use” (e.g., Bard, 1990).
In contrast, mentalistic definitions of intentional
communication define it in terms of the intentions of the
signaler (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1999; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). 
For example, Baron-Cohen (1999) defined intentional
communication as “communicative acts that are produced in
order to change the knowledge state of the listener” (p.
262).  Mere use of gesture to influence an observer to
acquire otherwise unreachable food would not be intentional
communication in a mentalistic perspective, because this
does not necessarily constitute evidence of (a) the
recognition that others have mental states that may differ
from one’s own or (b) an attempt to alter the mental state
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of the observer, both of which are implied by mentalistic
definitions of intentional communication. 
The difference between behavioral and mentalistic
definitions of intentional is highlighted by the distinction
between protoimperative pointing (pointing to request
objects) and protodeclarative pointing (pointing to share
attention to, or comment upon, distant objects or events). 
A vigorous research program launched in the 1970's by Bates
and her colleagues has sought to test Piaget’s (e.g., Piaget
& Inhelder, 1969) claim that language acquistion in
childhood is subsidiary to, or derived from, changes in
cognitive competence (e.g., Bates et al., 1975, 1977, 1989,
1991).  Bates and her associates have explored the early
prelinguistic communicative repertoires of infants in terms
of the pragmatic functions of language, which they derived
from Austin’s (1962) Speech Act Theory.  Like many pragmatic
accounts (cf. Skinner, 1957), this perspective on language
emphasizes the functions of linguistic communication: a
speech act can serve to enact a state of matrimony, bind
parties into contracts, request objects, request
information, to comment upon an event, person, or object,
etc.  Bates and associates (e.g., Bates et al., 1975) then
extended these linguistic functional categories to the
domain of prelinguistic communication.  Thus, in their
account, an act of speech that is requestive in function
would be referred to as an “imperative”; whereas a
behavioral pattern exhibited by a prelinguistic infant to
(apparently) request something, is termed “protoimperative.” 
A speech act that serves to comment on an event, person, or
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object, is termed a “declarative,” and precursors to mature
declaratives are termed “protodeclaratives.”
This distinction between protoimperatives and
protodeclaratives has been adopted by Baron-Cohen in a
number of experimental analyses of the gestural
communication of autistic children (summarized in Baron-
Cohen, 1995).  In short, Baron-Cohen and others have found
that although autistic children do point to objects in the
context of requesting those objects (protoimperative
pointing), they do not generally point to objects to comment
upon them (protodeclarative pointing).  Baron-Cohen
interprets this finding to indicate that autistic children
lack a cognitive mechanism for sharing attention; that they
do not have the capacity or motivation to engage in joint
apprehension of objects as an end in itself.
As used here, “intentional communication” does not
refer to a hypothetical motivational state in an organism,
which is causal in subsequent behavior (i.e., it is not
synonymous with “volitional”), nor is it limited to acts of
communication intended to alter the knowledge state of an
observer; rather, intentional is used here to describe
communicative behaviors that refer to specific objects,
locations, events or entities.  The term “refer” may require
some qualification.  Its use here is not intended to
describe the motivational basis of communication; rather, an
organism(A)is described as standing in a referential
relation to a second organism (B) and a third party
organism, object, event, or location (C) when both B and C
can be demonstrated to have exerted stimulus control over
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the postures, gestural orientations, or visual orienting
behavior of A.  “Intentional communication,” therefore, is
behavior that integrates event- or object-oriented behaviors
with behaviors that capture and re-direct the attention of
another social agent and is used flexibly in a manner that
is sensitive to the behavioral cues of the attentional
status of an observer.  This functional approach follows
that advocated by Bruner (1975), who noted the “morass into
which it leads when one tries to establish whether something
was really, or consciously intended” (p. 262, emphasis his). 
The advantage in positing a function (as opposed to a mental
state) in a communicative episode is that behavior can be
defined with reference to objectively measurable aspects of
the context: e.g., the temporal-spatial relations between
the orientation of a gesture and objects in an environment,
the spatial relations between gaze-orienting behavior and
objects and social agents, the influence of observer
presence or other observer characteristics on gestural
production, etc.  “Unintentional communication,” then, is
behavior by an actor, A, that is not influenced by the
presence or visual attention of another social agent, B
(e.g. simple reaching), or behavior that is influenced by
the presence or other attributes of B, but is not
simultaneously under the stimulus control of a third
element, C (e.g., fixed, or modal action patterns).  It is
important to emphasize that the behavioral definition of
intentional communication used here is much more general
than the more restrictive mentalistic definition--
encompassing, as it does, both behaviors exhibited in the
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context of requesting things and in the context of sharing
attention to, or commenting upon, distant objects or events.
Current theoretical interpretations of the transition
to intentional communication are diverse.  Piaget (as
summarized in Bard, 1987; Butterworth & Harris, 1994; Owens,
1996) proposed a constructionist account of sensorimotor
intelligence, which attributed increased behavioral
competencies to increasingly hierarchical relations between
hypothetical cognitive structures developed through
interaction between an organism and its environment. This
theoretical perspective is grounded in an explicit analogy
between (a) the relationship of mental systems to
environmental change and (b) the dynamic interplay between
organisms’ physical systems and changes in the environment. 
In the Piagetian perspective, development is characterized
as a series of “stages” of cognitive complexity, which occur
in invariant order.  Development over the course of the
infancy period is termed the “Sensorimotor Stage” of
development, which is, in turn, subdivided into six
substages.  Substage IV, termed “coordinated secondary
circular reactions,” and lasting from approximately nine to
12 months of age, is construed as a level of cognitive
organization in which acquired behavioral patterns (termed
“secondary circular reactions”) are combined into new
behavioral complexes.  An example of coordinated secondary
circular reactions is a sequence of activities in which an
infant might reach toward and grasp a cloth that is covering
an object (a secondary circular reaction), remove the cloth
and release it from its grasp (a second secondary circular
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reaction), and reach forward to grasp the revealed object (a
third secondary circular reaction) (example from Butterworth
& Harris, 1994).  The theoretical significance of this stage
of development for the advent of intentional communication
is that, in the Piagetian framework, this marks the first
time in development that goals are specified in advance of
behavioral activity.  It is also at this age that infants
begin to use objects in social interactions with their
caregivers (e.g., Adamson, 1996; Bruner, 1983), for example,
infants at this age might bang a toy on the substrate and
visually orient toward social partners.
Substage V, in the Piagetian framework, is termed
“tertiary circular reactions,” and lasts from approximately
12 months to 18 months.  This stage of development is
characterized by the trial-and-error discovery of new means
to established ends.  Among the behaviors that characterize
this stage of development is the use of objects to
manipulate other objects (termed “instrumentalization”).  An
example of instrumentalization is the use of a stick to
obtain an otherwise unreachable object.  The use of a person
to obtain an otherwise unreachable object is considered to
be an example of a tertiary circular reaction involving the
instrumental use of person to obtain an object (i.e.,
“social tool use,” cf. Bard, 1990).
The relevance of the Piagetian account of human
development to the present report is its empirical validity:
irrespective of the ontogenetic status of the cognitive
changes that are hypothesized to underlie the various
behavioral transitions in the first two years of life, these
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changes in behavior are exceedingly well-established; the
basic observations have been replicated in diverse cultures,
in both laboratory and naturalistic contexts.  As noted by
Scarr-Salapatek (1976), “all nondefective [human] infants
reared in natural human environments achieve all of the
sensorimotor skills that Piaget has described” (p. 185). 
The behavioral transition to intentional communication,
beginning at about nine months of age, has been isolated as
a developmental milestone from numerous theoretical
positions, including maturational theories (e.g., Trevarthan
& Hubley, 1978), other social constructionist accounts
(e.g., Bates et al., 1977, 1979; Bruner, 1983), and behavior
analytic approaches to language development (e.g., Horne &
Lowe, 1996).  Common to all of these theoretical accounts is
the empirical transition in human infancy from primarily
object-centered activity to an integration of object-
centered activities with concurrent social activities (for
example, infants at approximately nine months of age begin
to take the initiative in games of “give-and-take,” Bruner,
1983).  Thus, the temporal course of the advent of
intentional communication in human infants is a widely
recognized, though variously defined, phenomenon (Table 1).
Given the numerous reports relating pointing behavior
in humans to language acquisition (e.g., Baldwin, 1995; 
Bates et al., 1977, 1989; 1991), it is of considerable
interest whether, and under what circumstances, our nearest
living relatives, the great apes, point to distant objects. 
The comparative data are reviewed in the next chapter.
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(in months) Developmental Milestones
 8-12 Use of objects to in face-to-face
interaction (joint object
engagement).
 9-13 Gesturing at objects some distance
from both signaler and observer
(triadic communication).
12-15 Gesturing with gaze alternation




REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON POINTING BY APES
In recent decades, numerous authorities have asserted
that pointing is a uniquely human behavior (e.g.,
Butterworth & Grover, 1988; Pettito, 1988; Povinelli &
Davis, 1994; Werner & Kaplan, 1963).  For example, Petitto
claimed that “apes . . . do not point to a referent while
moving eye gaze to and fro between the referent and the
caretaker to establish joint visual regard” (1988, pp. 216-
217). More recently, Povinelli and Davis asserted that
chimpanzees reared and tested extensively in human
laboratories often display reaches that appear to
be somewhat like pointing . . . ., however, in
such subjects pointing with the index finger does
not develop, even in those subjects trained to
respond to human indexical pointing (Povinelli &
Davis, 1994, p. 134). 
Yet, reports of pointing by apes in the scientific
literature date to as early as 1916 (Furness, 1916, see
Table 2).  Because issues of definition often confuse this
dialogue, a distinction will be made here between structural
and functional definitions of pointing.  One can, in both
theory and common practice, direct the attention of another
social being in a variety of ways.  For example, de Waal 
(2001) describes a common “cocktail party” phenomenon in 
which a signaler subtly captures the visual attention of a 
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Table 2. Reports of pointing by apes
Species and source N
Pongo pygmaeus (orangutan)
Furness, 1916  1
Miles, 1990  1
Gómez & Teixidor, 1992  1
Call & Tomasello, 1994  1*
Gorilla gorilla (gorilla)
Patterson, 1978  1
Pan paniscus (bonobo)
Savage-Rumbaugh, Wilkerson, & Bakeman, 1977  3a
Savage-Rumbaugh, 1984, 1986  1
Veà & Sabater-Pi, 1998  1a
Pan troglodytes (chimpanzee)
Furness, 1916    1
Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933  1
Hayes & Hayes, 1954    1
Gardner & Gardner, 1971  1
Terrace, 1979    1
Woodruff & Premack, 1979    4
Fouts, Hirsch, & Fouts, 1982  1
de Waal, 1982  2a
Bard & Vauclair, 1984  1a
Tomasello, George, Kruger, Farrar
 & Evans, 1985  1a
Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986  2a
Boysen & Berntson, 1989  1
Povinelli, Nelson, & Boysen, 1990  3*
Leavens, Hopkins, & Bard, 1996  3
Inoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa, 1997  1+a
Krause & Fouts, 1997  2
Whiten, 2000 (cf. C. Menzel, 1999)  1
Leavens & Hopkins, 1998 50*
Total 87+
Pointing as reported in these studies involved ape-apea
interactions, pointing as reported in all the other studies
cited involved ape-human interaction.  Asterisks denote
studies that included apes reported to point that were also
included in and reported to point in earlier studies cited
here; such apes were included only once in the N column and,
therefore, the Total.  Pluses indicate the minimum number of
apes reported to point, where the number of pointing apes
was not reported.
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partner and redirects it toward a party newcomer, with an
eyebrow flash and subsequent glance with raised chin toward
the newcomer.  E. Menzel (1973), discussing the behavioral
basis for communication about distant objects in a group of
young chimpanzees, described “postural and locomotor
pointing” (p. 218). Thus, at the most general level of
description, any behavior that “refers to” a distant object,
event, location, or social agent can be referred to as
pointing; this is a functional definition of pointing. In
the human developmental literature, however, the term
pointing is restricted to a specific posture of the hand, in
which the arm and index finger are extended and the
remaining fingers flexed; this, then, is a structural
definition of pointing (e.g., Butterworth, 2000). 
 Further complicating the issue is that humans and apes
often indicate distant objects with several or all fingers
of the hand extended; these whole-handed finger extensions
are typically termed “reaches,” despite the apparently
communicative function they serve for both humans and apes
(e.g., Blake, O’Rourke, & Borzellino, 1992; Franco &
Butterworth, 1996; Leung & Rheingold, 1981; see Bruner,
1983, for a distinction between “reach to communicate” and
“reach to grasp” and see Leavens & Hopkins, 1999, for
terminological and functional discussion of this issue). 
Leavens and Hopkins (1998, 1999) have argued that the term
“reach” is ambiguous; they prefer the term “whole hand
point” to describe apparently communicative finger
extensions involving multiple digits, distinguishing these
from actual attempts at prehension, which they term
17
“reaches.”  The present report will use the term pointing in
a functional fashion, referring to pointing with the index
finger as either “indexical pointing” (e.g., Krause & Fouts,
1997; Leavens, Hopkins, & Bard, 1996; Povinelli & Davis,
1994) or “canonical pointing” (Butterworth, 2000) and to
pointing with multiple fingers extended as “whole-hand
pointing” (Krause & Fouts, 1997; Leavens et al., 1996;
Leavens & Hopkins, 1998, 1999; de Waal, 1982).
Experimental Studies of Pointing by Apes
 The first experimental study of pointing by apes was
that by Woodruff and Premack (1979), employing a sample of
four juvenile chimpanzees (one male, all estimated to have
been between 22 and 28 months of age).  In this study, one
experimenter baited one of two containers in view of one of
four chimpanzee subjects.  One of two other experimenters
then entered the room and attempted to guess which of the
two containers had been baited, using cues from the
orienting and communicative behaviors of the chimpanzees. 
On half of the trials, the second experimenter was a
“friendly” experimenter who delivered the food to the
chimpanzee, if he selected the baited container.  On the
other half of the trials, the second experimenter was a
“competitive” experimenter who removed the banana and then
departed the room.  The friendly and competitive
experimenters dressed in distinctive ways; for example, the
competitive experimenter wore a bandana over his face, like
a bandit.  Two of the four chimpanzees (Jessie and Luvie)
inhibited communicative responses and orienting behavior to
the baited bucket (including pointing) in the presence of
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the competitive experimenter, but not the friendly
experimenter.  The two other subjects (Sadie and Bert) began
to point to the unbaited container in the presence of the
competitive experimenter, but continued to point to the
baited container in the presence of the friendly
experimenter.  Pointing was exhibited by all four subjects
and was defined as arm or leg protrusions in the direction
of one of the containers.  The authors emphasized that
pointing had not been observed in any other context in this
sample.  Thus, all four chimpanzees exhibited control over
their pointing behavior, adjusting their behavior in
accordance with characteristics of their audience (friendly
vs. competitive).
The second experimental study of pointing by apes was
that by Call and Tomasello (1994), in a study of the
production and comprehension of pointing by two orangutans,
one sign-language-trained (Miles, 1990) and the other not
language-trained.  In a test of pointing production, three
boxes were placed in wire mesh cages arranged in a row in
front of the subjects’ cages; one of these boxes was baited
in view of the subjects by the first experimenter (E1).  Two
kinds of trials were administered during pretraining: in
tool trials, the second experimenter (E2) waited for the
subject to point to one of the boxes and then used a rake to
pull the box to the side of the cage, reached in, and
delivered the food to the subject (if the subject indicated
an empty box, then E2 showed the subject the empty box and
departed).  In no-tool trials, the boxes were placed in the
cages next to the mesh, so that E2 could reach directly
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through the mesh to retrieve any food that had been left
there.  Again, only if the subject indicated, by pointing,
to the baited box did the subject get the food; otherwise,
as in the tool trials, E2 showed the subject the empty box
and departed.  After this pretraining period, a hidden tool
condition was introduced.  In this test condition, the tool
used to move the box to the side of its cage was itself
hidden by E1 behind one of three screens mounted on the wall
opposite the subject’s cage.  When E2 arrived, he waited for
the subject to point to one of the three screens, then, if
the rake was found, waited for the subject to point to one
of the boxes.  Chantek, the language-trained orangutan,
performed at high levels during this test, pointing
correctly to both the hidden tool location and the hidden
food location from the twelth to the twentieth of 21 trials. 
Puti, in contrast, performed very poorly, failing to point
to the tool location on all 21 trials and pointing to the
hidden food on only three of the 21 trials.  After the tenth
trial, Puti ceased responding.  Puti was given remedial
training, her performance improved, and the authors
concluded that the orangutans “seemed to understand
something of the communicative value of their pointing
gesture in directing a human to entities and locations that
were instrumental in obtaining food” (Call & Tomasello,
1994, p. 312).
Call and Tomasello (1994) then tested the orangutans’
comprehension of human pointing.  E1 entered, retrieved all
three boxes from their cages, moved with the boxes behind an
occluder, and baited one of the boxes.  E1 then returned the
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boxes to their cages, pointed to the baited container in
view of the subject, and departed.  E2 arrived and, as
before, situated himself behind the middle cage and waited
for the subject to point to one of the boxes.  Chantek
pointed to the baited container on 33 of 63 trials, which
was significantly above chance (chance = 33%), whereas Puti
pointed to the baited container on only 20 of 63 trials (32%
correct, or essentially chance).  Neither subject improved
over three sessions of 21 trials each.  Both subjects
exhibited some perseveration by pointing to the box that had
been baited on the previous trial. 
In their final experiment, Call and Tomasello (1994)
assessed the influence of the state of observer visual
attention on the pointing of their subjects.  During
baseline trials, an experimenter filled each of two glasses
with different amounts of juice, displaced the glasses on a
platform so that they were 60 cm. apart.  When the subject
pointed to one of the glasses, the experimenter delivered
the juice to the subject.  On test (probe) trials, the
experimenter waited 30 seconds before delivering the juice
to the subject and during this interval adopted one of four
postures: (a) remained seated, facing subject, eyes open,
(b) remaining seated, facing subject, eyes closed, (c)
walking to a corner of the room and facing away from
subject, and (d) exiting the room.  Chantek pointed far more
when the experimenter was facing him with his eyes open,
compared to the other three conditions.  Puti, in contrast,
pointed equally often during the eyes open and eyes closed
conditions, but pointed much less when the experimenter was
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facing away or out of the room.
In their general discussion, Call and Tomasello (1994)
concluded that Chantek, by virtue of his intimate rearing
with humans, “had come to understand human beings as
intentional agents who have voluntary control over their
behavior and attention” (p. 315).  What the authors appear
to mean by understanding others as intentional agents is an
ability to (a) discriminate states of visual attention and
(b) manipulate visual attention in others, although it
should be said that the authors do not adequately define
“attention,” “intentional agents,” etc.  Presumably, “visual
attention” is a hypothetical construct that is correlated
with observable visual orienting behavior.  Thus, for
example, an observer facing away from a signaler cannot be
“attending” to the signaler.  It is clear from their later
publications that Call & Tomasello (e.g., 1996; Tomasello &
Call, 1997) believe that some apes, including humans, deploy
their gestural and visual orienting behaviors on the basis
of a discrimination of the “intentional” states of other
social agents (i.e., organisms make inferences about the
goals and other epistemic states of other organisms and
these inferred goals are used to predict the behavior of
others).  Call and Tomasello (1994) attribute these
capacities to exposure, early in development, to particular
patterns of reinforcement in joint attentional contexts,
such as is experienced by human children.  In later writing,
Call and Tomasello (e.g., 1996; Tomasello & Call, 1997) seem
to posit a sort of joint attentional rubicon, across which
an organism (ape or human) engages in discrimination of and
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manipulation of intentional states in others, by virtue of
rearing by humans (Locke, 1999, p. 339, refers to this as a
kind of “psychological alchemy”).  Such an organism is, in
their view, “enculturated.” 
An experimental study of pointing by three chimpanzees
was reported by Leavens, Hopkins, and Bard (1996).  The
impetus for their study was the observation of apparent
pointing behavior by an adolescent male chimpanzee named
Clint.  Clint had been administered a variety of matching-
to-sample tasks via a computerized test system that used an
automatic reinforcement dispenser to deliver peanuts or
grapes to Clint when he made a correct response (i.e., when
he selected a comparison stimulus that matched a sample
stimulus).  The reinforcement dispenser occasionally failed
to deliver the food to a delivery tube mounted on the
computer cart, sending the grape or peanut, instead, into
the corridor outside Clint’s reach.  In this context, he was
observed to extend his index finger toward the fallen food
in the presence of an experimenter, while alternating his
gaze between the fallen food and the experimenter, and
occasionally vocalizing (thus, apparently exhibiting all the
hallmarks of intentional communication).  Leavens et al.
(1996) videotaped Clint for over 18 hours as he performed
matching-to-sample problems, noting all finger extensions
directed outside his cage and whether these finger
extensions were exhibited in the presence or absence of
human observers.  In the course of coding the videotapes, it
became apparent that both of Clint’s female cagemates, Flora
and Anna, also exhibited finger extensions outside the cage
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mesh from the first videotaped session.
The most significant finding in this study was that of
the 256 finger extensions recorded, 254 were exhibited in
the presence of a human observer; thus, the finger
extensions were subject to the presence of an observer. 
Because the camera was oriented in such a way as to capture
Clint’s behavior and because his work with the computer
apparatus kept him in a fairly constant position, visual
orienting behavior was only recorded for Clint.  Clint
exhibited gaze alternation (defined as looking successively
at a social agent and at an object, usually food) during 76%
of his finger extensions and vocalized during 24% of his
finger extensions (it should be noted that reliability
estimates for both gaze alternation and vocalizations were
relatively modest: Cohen’s Kappas were .55 and .52 for gaze
alternation and vocalizations, respectively).  In those few
instances when Clint exhibited finger extensions in the
presence of someone other than Leavens (14 episodes), the
probability of reinforcement was lower than in the presence
of Leavens (p = .357 and .514, respectively).  Clint’s
behavior in the presence of people other than Leavens varied
in accordance with this difference: He exhibited only
slightly more gaze alternation (during 79% of finger
extensions), but substantially more vocal behavior (during
55% of finger extensions) when gesturing in the presence of
people who were less attentive or responsive to his
communicative behavior.  Finally, Leavens et al. (1996)
reported that the three chimpanzees exhibited finger
extensions with their index fingers during 37% of their
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extensions (86 of 233 finger extensions for which hand use
could be assessed), and that index-finger extensions were
substantially associated with the right hand (18% with the
left hand, 67% with the right hand).
On the basis of this evidence, Leavens et al. (1996)
concluded that the chimpanzees were pointing and, because
these subjects were not raised in the kind of intimate,
culturally rich manner in which language-trained apes are
generally reared, that “enculturation” is not necessary for
the development of pointing in chimpanzees (contra Call &
Tomasello, 1994).  Because these subjects frequently pointed
with the index finger, Povinelli and Davis’ (1994) claim
that chimpanzees don’t point with the index finger was
therefore refuted.   Leavens et al. (1996) speculated that
the barrier to directly grasping fallen food (the cage
mesh), combined with established histories of profligate
food provisioning by humans, established a problem space
unique to captive (as compared with feral) apes.  They noted
the apparent parallels between the contexts in which these
apes pointed and the contexts in which human infants begin
to point: Infants can see objects of interest, but due to
inherent limitations on their locomotor capacities, and
given their histories of object- and food-delivery by older
caregivers, come to discern their caregivers as means in the
solution of particular problems in the acquisition of
otherwise unreachable objects.
Leavens and Hopkins (1998; Hopkins and Leavens, 1998)
reasoned that if the foregoing speculations were correct,
then pointing should be far more common among captive
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chimpanzees than heretofore recognized.  They assessed the
communicative behaviors of 115 chimpanzees, ranging in age
from 3 to 56 years.  In this experiment, one experimenter
(E1) placed one half of a banana on the ground one meter
from either the left or right wall (defined with reference
to a chimpanzee facing out of the cage) of each subject’s
cage, then departed.  A second experimenter (E2) arrived
after approximately 30 seconds, faced the subject, and
recorded all apparent gestural behavior, vocal behavior, and
whether or not subjects exhibited gaze alternation (looked
successively between the banana and E2).  If the subject
exhibited either gestures or vocalizations, they were
immediately rewarded with the banana.  If, after
approximately 30 seconds, the subject did not exhibit
gestures or vocalizations, then they were given the banana.
Of the 115 subjects, 78 exhibited some kind of gesture
(68% of subjects).  Of the 78 subjects who gestured, 16
(21%) exhibited food begs (hand held toward E2 in a supine,
usually “cupped” posture), 42 exhibited pointing with the
whole hand (54%), six exhibited pointing with the index
finger (8%), five exhibited both food begs and points (6%),
and nine exhibited a variety of other apparently
communicative behaviors, including presentation of the rump,
a tickle solicit, three apparent attempts to barter food
scraps for the banana, two cage-banging responses, a lip
pout (protrusion of lower lip), and a repeated biting of the
right thumb (12%).  Subjects were categorized on the basis
of whether they (a) both vocalized and gestured, (b)
gestured only, (c) vocalized only, or (d) neither vocalized
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nor gestured.  Strikingly, 100% of the 27 subjects who both
vocalized and gestured also exhibited gaze alternation
between the banana and E2.  Eighty percent of the 51
subjects who gestured only also exhibited gaze alternation,
as did 75% of the 8 subjects who vocalized only.  Of the 29
subjects who neither vocalized nor gestured, only 41%
exhibited this gaze alternating behavior.  Because pointing
was the most common gesture elicited (68% of gestures
included pointing), Leavens and Hopkins (1998) concluded
that pointing was a commonly exhibited gesture at their
study site (the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center, in
Atlanta, GA).  Leavens and Hopkins also concluded that
subjects were not reaching for the (obviously unreachable)
bananas because (a) pointing was associated with high levels
of gaze alternation, as were other unambiguously
communicative gestures, such as food beg responses and (b)
subjects’ hand use while pointing was random with respect to
side of banana placement; that is, the chimpanzees were as
likely to use the hand contralateral to the side of food
placement as the hand ipsilateral to the side of food
placement, and this is inconsistent with patterns of
reaching in other experimental contexts, in which reaching
to laterally presented food items is typically exhibited
with the ipsilateral hand by humans and apes (Welles, 1976).
In a separate report of hand use while gesturing, using
the same data set reported above, Hopkins and Leavens (1998)
reported that chimpanzees exhibited an overall right-hand
bias in gestures.  This was particularly evident for the
food beg gesture, a well-described, species-typical gesture
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(e.g., van Lawick-Goodall, 1968; Plooij, 1978; Teleki,
1973): of the 19 food begs recorded, 16 (84%) were exhibited
with the right hand.  Strikingly, individuals who vocalized
while gesturing were more likely to use the right hand,
compared to individuals who did not vocalize while
gesturing.  This is suggestively similar to the case of hand
use while gesturing by humans: Humans are predominantly
right-handed in their gestural behavior and even more right-
handed when they vocalize while gesturing or exhibiting
other unimanual activities (Dalby, Gibson, Grossi, &
Schneider, 1980; Hampson & Kimura, 1984).  This phenomenon
has been taken as evidence for the “overflow hypothesis” of
Kinsbourne and Hicks (1978).  According to this hypothesis,
spreading electrochemical activation from one functional
area of the cerebral cortex (e.g., Broca’s area while
speaking) influences adjacent neural tissue (e.g., primary
motor cortex controlling the limbs and hands), resulting in
a lower threshold for motoric activity.  Hopkins and Leavens
(1998) suggested that (a) there may be a functional
asymmetry in chimpanzee cerebral hemispheres that is related
to intentional communication and (b) an overflow mechanism
like that hypothesized by Kinsbourne and Hicks (1978), and
linking vocal and gestural behavior, might be evident not
only in humans, but in chimpanzees as well.  Hopkins and
Leavens (1998) concluded that neural imaging technology will
be of use in testing these hypotheses in the near future.
Krause and Fouts (1997) reported pointing by two sign-
language-trained chimpanzees, Moja and Tatu.  They
administered two experiments.  In the first experiment, E1
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baited one of two containers placed five meters apart and
far enough to prevent the subjects from reaching into the
containers and then departed.  E2 then entered, turned on
the videocamera, and sat facing away from the subjects.  E2
turned around only after the subject exhibited some audible
signal (including “bronx cheers,” hand claps, cage-banging,
foot stomp, linguistic signs performed with sufficient force
to make a distinct sound, and combinations of these).  After
turning in response to an audible signal, E2 fixed his gaze
on the subject.  When the subject pointed to one of the two
containers, E2 arose and delivered the indicated food to the
subject.  Each subject received 50 trials over a 37-day
period.
Strikingly, audible (“attention-getting”) signals were
emitted by both subjects prior to pointing on 100% of the
100 trials (50 trials each).  On 99 of the 100 trials,
pointing was exhibited after E2 had established eye contact. 
Gaze alternation between one of the containers and the
experimenter was exhibited during 97 of the 100 trials.  The
subjects pointed to the baited container on 99 of the 100
trials.  In this study, 72% of the points emitted with the
left hand were with the index finger (the remainder being
with the whole hand) and 92% of the points emitted with the
right hand were with the index finger.  Krause and Fouts
(1997) argued that the pointing was communicative in
function (i.e., that the finger extensions did not
constitute “reaches” toward the food).
Krause and Fouts’ (1997) second experiment was designed
to assess the accuracy with which these two chimpanzees
29
pointed.  Four containers were arranged such that there were
two placed on the ground 1.2 meters apart with the other two
containers placed 1.2 meters above the lower two.  Each
subject received 40 trials (80 trials total), over a 34-day
period.  After one of the containers had been baited by E1,
E2, the interactor, entered the room and responded to the
chimpanzees’ points.  After delivering the food to the
chimpanzee, E2 recorded on a piece of paper which box had
been pointed to by the chimpanzees, left the slip of paper
in the food bowl, and delivered the bowl to E1, who recorded
this information on a cumulative data log.  A third
individual, the observer, also coded the target location of
each point from videotape.  Reliability between observers
and interactors was high: Cohen’s kappa = .83.
Krause and Fouts (1997), found that the percentage of
trials scored as correct (chimpanzee perceived as pointing
to the baited box) was significantly above chance for both
chimpanzees and for both the observer and the interactant. 
In this experiment, all points observed were exhibited with
the index fingers.  As Krause and Fouts noted, this second
experiment both required and elicited greater precision in
the form of pointing (i.e., much more pointing with the
index finger), compared to the first experiment, though it
remains unclear which aspects of the differences between the
two experiments influenced the number of fingers extended
while pointing by these two chimpanzees.
In a recent study of long-term memory for object
location, C. Menzel (1999) reported on the pointing behavior
of Panzee, a female, language-trained chimpanzee housed at
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the Language Research Center at Georgia State University. 
In brief, over a period of 268 days, an experimenter
presented 34 trial-unique experimental trials in which he
hid, in full view of Panzee, food or nonfood objects in the
woods outside Panzee’s outdoor enclosure, confined to an
area of approximately 160 square meters.  Over this period
of 268 days, there were 57 days during which an item was
hidden in the woods and 211 days during which no item was
hidden.  In the ensuing days, caregivers recorded whether
Panzee “solicited” their attention and directed them to the
woods in which the objects were hidden.  These caregivers
were “uninformed” in the sense that they did not know
whether there were any hidden items on any given day, though
they did know that objects would be sporadically hidden. 
Panzee pointed to the location of a hidden object on 34 of
the 57 days in which objects were hidden in the woods (i.e.,
on some days, though objects were hidden, Panzee did not
direct the attention of the caretakers to these objects). 
In contrast, during the 211 days in which no items were
hidden, Panzee exhibited pointing on only 3 days.  Latencies
from the time Panzee observed an item being hidden to the
time that she captured and re-redirected the attention of
one of the caregivers to that hidden item ranged from .03
hours to 304.4 hours.
More recently, Whiten (2000) reported the effects of
the epistemic status of an experimenter on the pointing
behavior of Panzee (the experiment used three chimpanzee
subjects, Panzee, Austin, and Sherman, but only results from
Panzee were reported).  It is unclear from a preprint of
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this chapter precisely how many trials of each type were
administered (baseline, experimental, and control) as it is
stated that “Panzee received 100 . . . baseline trials” (p.
150) and that 10 experimental trials were “interspersed
amongst the last 80 of these baseline trials” (p. 150) and
an unspecified number of control trials was also
“interspersed amongst the last 80 baseline trials” (p. 151);
probably 10 control trials were administered.  For the
following description it will be assumed that Panzee
received 120 trials, of which 100 were baseline trials, 10
were experimental trials, and 10 were control trials.
The first 20 trials were baseline trials which unfolded
in the following way.  A Hider entered the room outside
Panzee’s cage holding an “attractive” food item (p. 150),
grasped a key hanging in front of the cage, used the key to
open one of two boxes placed a meter apart, put the food in
the box, locked the box, returned the key to its hook, and
departed.  A minute or two later, the Helper entered the
room, stood between the two boxes, looked at Panzee and said
“Okay, Panzee.”  Panzee pointed consistently to the baited
box during these baseline trials.  In the 10 experimental
trials, the procedure was altered as follows: the Helper,
not the Hider, entered with food, took the key, used the key
to unlock one of the boxes, baited the box with the food,
returned the key to the hook, and then departed.  A minute
or two later, the Hider entered, took the key, and put the
key in one of seven different locations (three locations
were used twice), then departed.  Thus, the epistemic state
of the Helper was such that he was ignorant of key location. 
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In each of the first nine experimental trials, Panzee
pointed to the location of the key on the return of the
Helper to the room.  Because Panzee also pointed to the key
during 13 of the 100 baseline trials, Whiten (2000) noted
that it was ambiguous whether Panzee was responding to the
epistemic status of the Helper (ignorant of key location) or
encouraging the Helper to act on a “useful part of the
environment” (p. 151).
An unspecified number of control trials (assumed here
to be 10) was conducted in which the Helper entered the
room, unlocked both boxes (leaving the padlocks open),
placed the key in a new location, then departed.  The Hider
then entered, baited one of the boxes, locked both boxes,
and departed without touching the key.  Thus, in these
control trials, the key was displaced, but the epistemic
status of the Helper was such that he knew the location of
the key, having placed it himself.   During “all but 2
trials” (p. 151) Panzee pointed to the baited box and not
the key location.  Whiten (2000) interpreted this finding to
indicate that Panzee was responding (pointing to either the
baited box or to the key) on the basis of the epistemic
status of the Helper.   Whiten speculated that intense
exposure to humans had enhanced Panzee’s ability to
discriminate epistemic states in others (this interpretation
is congruent with the position of Call & Tomasello, 1994,




RATIONALE FOR THE PROPOSED RESEARCH
The seven experimental studies discussed in the
previous chapter are summarized in Table 3. Perusal of Table
3 reveals that no experimental study of pointing by apes has
failed to find audience effects on the pointing, when such
audience effects have been designed into the study.  Effects
of observers on pointing reported to date include observer
presence (Call & Tomasello, 1994; Leavens et al., 1996),
observer visual attention (Call & Tomasello, 1994, Krause &
Fouts, 1997), differential histories of reinforcement
associated with different observers (Woodruff & Premack, 
Table 3. Summary of findings from experimental studies of
pointing in apes.
   Audience  Index   Language-
Study N  effects?  finger?  trained?
   Woodruff & Premack (1979) 4  Y      N      N
   Call & Tomasello (1994) 2  Y      Y(1)      Y(1)
   Leavens, Hopkins, & 
Bard (1996) 3  Y      Y(3)      N
   Krause & Fouts (1997) 2  Y Y(2)      Y(2)
   Leavens & Hopkins (1998)  53  - Y(6)      N
   Menzel (1999) 1  - Y      Y
   Whiten (2000) 1  Y Y      Y
Notes. “Y” indicates “yes,” “N” indicates “no.”  Numbers in
parentheses refer to the number of individuals exhibiting
either index-finger pointing or who were language-trained. 
Dashes indicate that no audience effects were assessed. 
1979), and, possibly, epistemic state of an observer
(Whiten, 2000).  However, despite the near ubiquity of these
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audience effects, they have been reported in exceedingly
small samples ranging from one to four animals.  No large-
scale assessment of audience effects on pointing by apes has
yet been performed.  For this reason, Experiment One,
reported below, is designed to assess the influence of an
observer on the gesture rates of chimpanzees in each of four
conditions: (a) neither food nor experimenter present, (b)
experimenter, but not food present, (c) food, but not
experimenter present, and (d) both food and experimenter
present.  Experiment 3 was designed, in part, to assess the
influence of the presence of an observer on the propensity
to gesture across two conditions: observer present and
observer absent, with food present throughout.
The second salient pattern evident in Table 3 is that
almost all experimental studies of pointing by apes report
some pointing with the index finger, thus refuting the
claims by Petitto (1988), Povinelli and Davis (1994), and
others (e.g., Butterworth & Grover, 1988; Werner & Kaplan,
1963), to the contrary.  Nevertheless, it remains true that
pointing with the index finger is exhibited at far higher
frequencies by language-trained apes than by apes who have
not been language-trained (Leavens & Hopkins, 1999); these
latter apes tend to point with their whole hands.
Therefore, it appears that rearing history may exert an
influence on the number of fingers extended while pointing. 
However, as noted by Krause and Fouts (1997), who found both
whole-hand and index-finger pointing in their two chimpanzee
subjects, it remains unclear which aspects of the stimulus
array may influence the number of fingers extended while
35
pointing in apes.  Among the possible factors discussed by
Krause and Fouts (1997) are the relative distances between
(a) the signaler and the desired object, (b) the relative
distances between baited containers, and (c) the number of
containers present in the stimulus array.  In an unpublished
study with 20 chimpanzee subjects, Leavens and Hopkins
assessed the effects of size and distance of food items on
gesture use.  Leavens and Hopkins found no influence of
either size or distance on the propensity of the chimpanzees
to gesture, nor was there any effect of the manipulation on
gesture type (i.e., subjects did not point more or less as a
function of size or distance of the food items).
 Pointing with the index finger characterized 37% of
the 233 points for which Leavens et al. (1996) could
confidently assess either which finger was extended or how
many fingers were extended.  Yet, in a large-scale survey of
the colony of chimpanzees at the Yerkes Regional Primate
Research Center (YRPRC), Leavens and Hopkins (1998) reported
that only six chimpanzees pointed with the index finger out
of 53 chimpanzees who pointed.  Because the latter study
involved placing half of a banana on a relatively
homogeneous surface (the corridor floor) a full meter from
each subject’s cage, whereas the study by Leavens et al.
(1996) involved either single peanut kernels or grapes or
random clusters of these food items which had fallen from
just a few centimeters to approximately 50 centimeters from
these subjects’ cage, it is possible that the relative
dispersion or spread of the food array may influence the
structure of pointing by chimpanzees.  Therefore, Experiment
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2 was designed to manipulate the relative dispersion of an
array of food, placing a single grape in the context of an
array of six peanuts, and varying the distance between these
seven food items.
Finally, Experiment 3 was designed to assess the
influence, if any, of whether a banana was visible or
hidden, upon the arrival of an experimenter.  There were two
questions here: (a) will chimpanzees modify their
communicative repertoires as a function of whether the
experimenter can or cannot see a banana, and (b) how good
are chimpanzees at communicating about hidden objects?  The
impetus for asking the first question derived from a study
of two-year-old children by O’Neill (1996).  O’Neill (1996)
demonstrated that more toddlers in her study gestured when
their mother was ignorant of object location (had not seen
the baiting event), compared to a condition in which the
mother was knowledgeable about the location of an object
(had seen the baiting event) (O’Neill, 1996).  A slightly
different question was asked here: Do chimpanzees alter
their communicative repertoire as function of whether a food
item is visible or hidden?  The reasoning is as follows: if
chimpanzees adjust their communicative behaviors in
accordance with what an observer can or cannot see, this can
be taken as evidence that they discriminate the visual
perspective of others.  (Since this experiment was designed
and conducted, a recent article by Hare, Call, Agnetta, &
Tomasello, 2000, presented strong evidence that chimpanzees
discriminated between (a) food items which could be seen by
a dominant chimpanzee and (b) food items which could not be
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seen by a dominant chimpanzee.  Thus, under some
experimental conditions, chimpanzees do discriminate what a
chimpanzee observer can or cannot see.)
With respect to the second question, how well do
chimpanzees communicate about hidden objects, E. Menzel
showed that young chimpanzees were quite skilled at
communicating about various aspects of hidden food,
including food location, food quantity, and food type (e.g.,
E. Menzel, 1971, 1973, 1974).  But these chimpanzees were
studied for years, from their juvenile periods to early
adolescence, during which period they had been tested in
many different experimental trials involving hidden and
visible food.  E. Menzel never observed pointing behavior
among these chimpanzees; if anything, the overt behavioral
accompaniments of their searching behaviors tended to
decrease in number and intensity with the passage of time
(E. Menzel, 1974, p. 130). 
 As reviewed above, pointing to hidden food or tools
has been reported for apes who have been raised in very
intimate association with humans (Call & Tomasello, 1994;
Krause & Fouts, 1997; C. Menzel, 1999; Whiten, 2000;
Woodruff & Premack, 1979).  These studies all involved
repeated presentations of a variety of different trial types
to relatively few subjects (ranging from 1 to 4).  The
procedure adopted here was to ask how competent were
chimpanzees who had not been raised in home-like
environments at communicating about hidden objects?  The
procedures employed in Experiment 3, and the other two
experiments reported here, rely exclusively on first-trial
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data presented to a large number of chimpanzees.
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CHAPTER 4
CONSTRAINTS ON THE PROPOSED RESEARCH
The overall procedural emphasis of this experiment and
the experiments described below was on “first-trial”
performance of chimpanzees.  Because the emphasis was on
assessing the use of communicative behaviors by these
chimpanzees, under various experimental circumstances, the
general method combined elements of both observational and
experimental approaches (Shaughnessy, Zechmeister, &
Zechmeister, 2000).  An attempt was made, in all cases, to
employ relatively “naturalistic” experimental paradigms. 
This does not mean that the experimenters attempted to mimic
any of the parameters of chimpanzees’ natural habitats;
rather, this means that the experimenters attempted to
conduct these procedures with a minimum of departure from
the routine circumstances of these captive chimpanzees’
daily lives.  In accordance with this general principle of
minimalist intervention, numerous sources of uncontrolled
variability will have entered the results, some of which
sources of uncontrolled variability are discussed here.
The Great Ape Wing at the YRPRC consists of five sub-
wings termed “A-wing,” “B-wing,” “C-wing,” “D-wing,” and “E-
wing” (henceforth, A, B, C, D, and E).  A through D are
arranged in a contiguous series of identically sized cages,
each of which has both an indoor and outdoor section.  The
dimensions of the indoor sections of these cages are 213 cm.
high, 229 cm. wide, and 213 cm. deep.  The dimensions of the
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outdoor sections are 213 cm. high, 229 cm. wide, and 335 cm.
deep.  There are corridors that run parallel to both the
inside and outside sections of the cages in A through D. 
The corridor along the outside sections of the cages is 234
cm. wide, and the corridor along the inside sections of the
cages is 236 cm. wide.  Perpendicular to the long axis of
these cages are short corridors that bisect this long line
of cages at two junctions: (a) between A and B and (b)
between C and D.  Relative to A through C, D is offset at an
angle of approximately 10 degrees.  The fifth wing, E, is
arranged perpendicular to the other wings, with one end
forming the junction of the two arms of an “L” with A, and
comprises much larger cages in which are housed relatively
large groups of chimpanzees.  The dimensions of the inside
sections of the cages on E are 290 cm. high, 305 cm. wide,
and 396 cm. deep.  The dimensions of the outside sections of
these cages are the same as the inside sections.  The
corridor along the outside sections is 267 cm. wide, and the
corridor along the inside sections is 295 cm. wide.  All
cages are separated on the inside by concrete walls, some of
which have steel gates which can be opened and closed.  All
cages on the outside are separated by a combination of
concrete wall and cage mesh of varying diameter, allowing
visual access to other chimpanzees.  The inside-facing and
outside-facing walls of the inside and outside cage
sections, respectively, are comprised of stainless steel
mesh with a diamond-shaped pattern of approximately 2.54 cm.
sides.
The layout of the chimpanzee cages at the YRPRC
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presents considerable difficulty in controlling the precise
time at which subjects become aware of the arrival or
impending arrival of the experimenters.  If, for example, a
chimpanzee is located towards the middle of a long corridor,
then an experimenter has to traverse a relatively long
distance and numerous cages housing other chimpanzees, who
often vocalize, throw feces, or otherwise react to the
passage of the experimenter.  Thus, the subject will usually
have information heralding the arrival of an experimenter
before the experimenter is in the precise positions called
for in the various experimental procedures described below. 
The latency of this “advance notice” relative to the time
the experimenter is in position, will vary, in part, as an
irregular function of how far a particular subject is from
one or the other end of the long corridors.  A decision had
to made as to whether it was more desirable to precisely
control the timing of the presentation of an experimenter to
each subject or to continue with the experiments in the face
of uncontrolled variation in the latencies between the
visual and auditory cues heralding the impending arrival of
an experimenter and the time the experimenter was in
position.  Given the circumstances, there are only two
methods to physically control this latency.  First, one
could move all animals except the subject to the outside
enclosures.  At THE YRPRC, there is no more disrupting
activity than to try to move, en masse, all chimpanzees
either to the inside sections or the outside sections of
their cages.  The level of disruption resulting from this
approach obviates its use in the experiments described
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below.  Second, one might construct an apparatus that
obscures the experimenter from the chimpanzees intervening
between the start position of the experimenter and the
subject’s cage.  This course was deemed undesirable because
the novelty and necessary size of such an apparatus
conflicts with the principle of minimal intervention, in
accordance with which these experiments were designed.  For
these reasons, most chimpanzees in the experiments described
below have uncontrolled advance warning of the arrival of
the experimenter.
These physical environmental factors also influence the
validity with which it can be claimed that trials are
“first-trial” exposures, insofar as cagemates and near-
neighbors of a specific subject will have had an opportunity
to observe the administration of the experimental conditions
to that subject and any other subjects who were tested
before them.  Thus, it is not possible to rule out
observational learning within the context of these
experiments as a factor in the behavioral responses. 
However, such observation is most pertinent to the findings
of Experiment 3, in which subjects’ responses could be
categorized as being either correct or incorrect.  As
described in the method section for Experiment 3, internal
checks were performed of the possibly facilitating effects
of being the second or later subject in a cage to be
administered the task.  Checks were performed on whether
being second or later in a cage to see a task had any
influence on performance or propensity to gesture.
A third methodological issue relates to the position of
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the subjects relative to the placement of the videocamera,
the food items employed to elicit communicative behaviors,
and the position of the experimenter.  In the three
experiments reported below, the chimpanzees were free to
move between and within the inside and outside sections of
their enclosures.  Any effort to control the position of the
subjects in their cages was deemed to be either so
disruptive or so time-consuming that it would have been
impossible to conduct these experiments in the time
available.  As a consequence, the amount of time each
subject appears in the video record varies considerably
across subjects.  This lack of control of the spatial
position of the chimpanzees introduces uncontrolled
variability in both the distances between subjects and both
food and experimenters, and the angles between these three
elements.  This will have had a direct effect on the
designation of a number of behavioral measures (described in
more detail below) such as whether subjects looked
successively between a bucket and an experimenter and
whether the orientation of a particular gesture was directed
toward a banana or a bucket rather than an experimenter.
This means that classification of gaze behaviors and
gestural orientations is based on a judgment by an observer
that is not defined in terms of a constant angle between
fixed elements, because this angle will vary across subjects
according to their position in the cage.  Classification of
the orientation of a gesture as being either person-directed
or object-directed, for example, is not defined here by a
constant angle or range of angles between the signaler’s arm
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and the putative targets of the gestures; rather, a
categorical judgment is made by the observer as to whether
the gesture is directed at the observer, at a food item (or
bucket), or at neither the observer nor the food item.  To
counter this consequence of the lack of control over
subjects’ spatial position, interobserver reliability
estimates were performed throughout the following
experiments on measures of gesture orientation and gaze
alternation.
CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT 1: AUDIENCE EFFECTS ON GESTURES
The purpose of the present experiment was to evaluate
the influence of observer and food presence on the
propensity to gesture by chimpanzees.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 35 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes, 15
females) housed at the Yerkes Regional Primate Research
Center (YRPRC), at Emory University, Atlanta, GA.  All
subjects were treated in accordance with the ethical
standards of the American Psychological Association
(American Psychological Association, 1992).  The history of
each subject’s participation in studies of gestural
communication is listed in the Appendix.
Subjects were selected from A and D of the Great Ape
Wing at YRPRC, because the cages in these sections were
relatively free of secondary reinforcing bars, which tend to
obscure behavioral observation (these reinforcing bars were
originally emplaced to contain gorillas).  Subjects were
observed in random order within wings: all subjects were
randomly assigned a number between 0 and 1 and then listed
in ascending order of this random number.  Testing occurred
first in A (on December 28, 1999) then in D (on December 30,
1999).
Materials







A videocamera was placed to each subject’s right,
approximately 1.5 m from the cage (this was the maximum
possible distance, due to the width of the corridor), and
oriented to encompass in the field of view as much as 
Figure 2. Experimental arrangement for Experiment 1. “C”
refers to the subject, “E2" refers to the second
experimenter. The grey crescent depicts a banana. Drawing
not to scale.
possible of the interior of each cage.  Due to limitations
in the ability of the experimenters to capture the entire
cage in the field of view the specific angle at which the
camera was oriented was adjusted on each trial in 
correspondence with the level of the substrate on which each 
subject began each trial.  If subject began a trial on the
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floor of the cage, the angle of the camera would be slightly
lower (more acute, relative to the plane of the floor) than
if a subject began a trial on a shelf, one meter above the
floor.  Thus, the angle of view differed slightly across
subjects, depending upon their initial position, in vertical
dimension, at the start of each trial.
Procedure
Subjects were administered four conditions in invariant
order: (a) neither food nor experimenter present, (b)
experimenter present, no food, (c) food present, no
experimenter, and (d) both food and experimenter present;
each sequence of four conditions comprised one trial.  The
duration of each condition varied across subjects, but was
held to a minimum of 15 seconds for all subjects in all
conditions (Table 4).  The total time that chimpanzees were
visible on tape was 36.52 minutes from a total observation
period of 49.57 minutes (i.e., over all four conditions, the
35 subjects were on camera a total of 74% of the time).
The procedure was as follows: Experimenter 1 (E1)
positioned the videocamera and announced “Start” as he
departed.  After a short interval, Experimenter 2 (E2) was
signaled by a hand wave to approach the cage.  E1 attempted
to ensure that the arrival of E2 coincided with an elapsed 
time of 15 seconds from the “start” signal, but this proved 
impossible in the majority of cases, for reasons discussed
above, so a minimum interval of 15 seconds duration for each 
condition was adopted. 
When E2 reached the position indicated in Figure 2, he
announced “Here.”  E2 looked at the subject, but did not 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics on the durations, in
seconds, of each condition and the durations subjects were
visible to the camera (N = 35). Condition 1: neither
experimenter nor food present. Condition 2: experimenter,
but not food present.  Condition 3: food, but not
experimenter present. Condition 4: both food and
experimenter present. 
Condition
1 2 3 4
Duration of condition
Mean 23.9 20.6 22.6 17.8
SD       2.7  1.8  2.1  2.5
Minimum 18.0 15.0 18.0 15.0
Maximum 29.0 25.0 29.0 27.0
Duration subjects on camera
Mean 19.8 15.9 16.5 10.5 
SD  7.6  7.2  7.7  8.2
Minimum  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Maximum 29.0 24.0 29.0 27.0
respond to any apparent communicative behaviors.  The
interval between the “start” and “here” signals comprised
Condition 1 (neither food nor experimenter present).  After
a minimum of 15 seconds, E1 gave a visual signal to E2 to
depart.  Roughly coincident with this signal, as E2
departed, E1 began a very rapid approach, simultaneously
placing the banana as indicated in Figure 2 and announcing
“food,” followed by a rapid departure (E1 avoided all eye
contact with the subjects).  The interval between the “here”
of E2 on arrival and the “food” signal defined the duration
of Condition 2 (experimenter, but not food present). After a
short (variable) interval, E1 signaled E2 to approach the
cage.  When E2 arrived in position (same position as in
Condition 2), he announced “here.”  The interval between the
“food” signal and the second “here” signal defined the
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duration of Condition 3 (food, but not experimenter
present).  After a minimum interval of 15 seconds, E1
announced “end.”  The interval between the second “here”
signal of E2 and the “end” signal comprised the duration of
Condition 4 (both experimenter and food present). 
Immediately after the “end” signal, either E1 or E2
delivered the banana to the subject.
Behavioral Measures
Gestural responses are defined as in Table 5.  A
distinction is made in Table 5 between object-directed and
person-directed gestures.  To qualify as a person- or
object-directed gesture, arm or finger extensions were
categorized with respect to two planes of reference, one
plane constituting the bottommost substrate (i.e., the
floor) and the other perpendicular to both this substrate 
and the axis of the cage mesh; these are termed the 
“horizontal” and “vertical” planes, respectively.  In the
horizontal plane, in Experiment 1, the locations of a banana
and the experimenter were constant, whereas the position of
the subject was uncontrolled.  For each trial, the position
of the chimpanzee was taken to be the focus of an angle
between the terminal points of the left and right walls of
the subject’s cage.  A dichotomous judgment was made with
respect to whether the orientation of a putative gesture was
more to the subject’s right side (toward the banana or
videocamera) or more toward the subject’s left side (toward
Experimenter 2).  In the vertical plane, again, the
positions of the subjects varied, both in height and in
distance from the cage mesh.  In general, arm or hand 
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Table 5. Response categories for Experiments 1, 2, and 3.
Object-directed gestures
   Whole-hand point Hand is oriented towards banana (or
bucket), palm is oriented either
vertically (with thumb at top) with
respect to the substrate, or in a
pronated position, or between these
two extremes.  At least two fingers
are extended.
   Index-finger point As for whole-hand point, but only
index finger is extended.
   Food beg1 Hand is oriented towards banana (or
bucket), palm is supinated.  Often,
fingers adopt a “cupped” posture.
Person-directed gestures
   Hold hand out Identical to Whole-hand point,
except that orientation is toward
the experimenter rather than the
banana or bucket.
   Food beg2 Identical to Food beg1, except that
hand is oriented towards the
experimenter rather than the banana
or bucket.
   “Barter attempt” Apparent attempt to trade some
items for food presented outside
cage: for example, pushing out
peanut shells while looking back-
and-forth between an unreachable
banana and an experimenter.
   Other Any other behavior that appears
communicative, but do not fit
easily into the above categories.
orientations that seemed to be directed in the vertical
plane within approximately 20 degrees above or below either
the banana or the experimenter’s thorax were categorized as
being experimenter- or banana-directed.
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In addition to gestural responses, visual orienting
behavior during Condition 4 was defined in dichotomous terms
as either constituting successive looking between the
videocamera (or banana) and E2 (gaze alternation) or not
constituting successive looking between the videocamera or
banana and E2.  Responses were recorded by E2 on a data
sheet during his presence in Conditions 2 and 4.  The
present author, who was E1 in all trials, independently
coded these behaviors from the videotaped record.
Reliability
Reliability was assessed by comparing the observations
from videotape with those performed by E2 in Conditions 2
and 4.  Included in the reliability assessments were those
individuals who were visible on tape throughout the
condition of interest and those individuals who were not
visible on videotape for the entire duration of the
condition of interest, but for whom both E2 and the separate
observer registered agreement that the subject did gesture
(Conditions 2 and 4), vocalize (Condition 4 only), or
exhibit gaze alternation between the banana and E2
(Condition 4 only).  Excluded from reliability assessments
were those individuals who were not visible on videotape for
the entire duration of the condition of interest and for
whom E2 had registered a non-response in the categories of
gesture, vocalization, and gaze alternation; this, because
it was therefore impossible to verify the absence of a
behavior in the interval of interest.  In Condition 2,
reliability on gesture type, including 23 subjects, was
calculated as Cohen’s kappa = .78; the corresponding
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analysis for Condition 4, including 16 subjects, was .80. 
Agreement as to whether subjects vocalized was 100% in
Condition 4 (due to a failure to communicate instructions
clearly, recording of the presence or absence of
vocalizations in Condition 2 by E2 was erratic--therefore
agreement was not assessed in Condition 2; data on the
presence or absence of vocal behavior for Condition 2 were
taken from the videotape, not from the original data
sheets).  Agreement as to whether or not subjects alternated
their gaze between the banana and E2 in Condition 4,
including 26 subjects, was Cohen’s kappa = .64.  Cohen’s
kappa corrects for agreement by random chance: kappas
between .4 and .6 are considered fair, between .6 and .75
good, and above .75 excellent (Bakeman and Gottman, 1986).
Analyses
To test the null hypothesis that gestures were randomly
distributed in time, Cochran’s Q was employed.  This
statistic is appropriate for data which can be dichotomously
categorized (i.e., “success” and “failure”) over more than
two levels of an independent variable which involves use of
the same or related samples in each level (Siegel, 1956);
the analogous test for nominal data over two levels of an
independent variable is McNemar’s test for symmetry.  Alpha
was set at .05 and tests were two-tailed.
Results
Observer and Food Effects on the Propensity to Gesture
Of 35 subjects, 17 gestured in this study.  Table 6
lists the 12 individuals who gestured on camera in 
Experiment 1.  An additional five chimpanzees gestured off 
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camera.  Time 1 refers to the time that E2 arrived in
position between Condition 1 and Condition 2.  Time 2 refers
to the time E1 declared “food,” which marks the division
between Condition 2 and Condition 3.  Time 3 refers to the
time that E2 arrived in position between Condition 3 and
Condition 4.  Figure 3 depicts the temporal distribution of
the first gestures exhibited by these 11 individuals, plus
the second gesture by one subject, Carl.  Table 7 lists all
individuals who gestured and in which condition(s) each
individual gestured, including data from those individuals
who did not gesture on camera.  It should be noted that 
Table 6. Individuals who gestured on camera in Experiment 1.
Time 1 refers to the transition between Condition 1 and
Condition 2 (no food, no experimenter to no food,
experimenter present).  Time 2 refers to the transition
between Condition 2 and Condition 3 (no food, experimenter
present to food present, experimenter absent).  Time 3
refers to the transition between Condition 3 and Condition 4
(food present, experimenter absent to food and experimenter
present).
           Latencies (in seconds)
Subject  Gesture type    Time 1    Time 2    Time 3
Lucy Hold Hand Out -2 -22 -46
Food Beg2  6 -14 -38
Carl Hold Hand Out  0 -19 -42
Whole Hand Point    46   27        4
Merv Hold Hand Out  3 -18 -38
Duncan Hold Hand Out -1 -16 -34
Brodie Food Beg2  6 -14 -35
Food Beg2 11  -9 -30
Boisfeuillet Whole Hand Point
   (at camera)  9 -13 -38
Ellie Whole Hand Point 41  19  -2
Whole Hand Point 48  26   5
Clint Hold Hand Out 50  25   5
Callie “Barter” 46  29   5
Reba Whole Hand Point 52  33   8
Food Beg2 61  42  17
Cheetah Food Beg2 47  27   8
Ossabaw Index Finger Point 57  36  15
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Figure 3. Distribution of gestures with respect to the time
E2 was fully in position during each of the three
transitions in Experiment 1.  Top panel depicts the
transition from Condition 1 to Condition 2 (T1), the middle
panel depicts the transition from Condition 2 to Condition 3
(T2), and the bottom panel depicts the transition from
Condition 3 to Condition 4 (T3).  One individual, Carl, is
represented twice, at 0 seconds in the top panel and at +4
seconds in the bottom panel. 
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Table 7. Individuals who gestured in Experiment 1. Zeros
denote “no gesture observed,” whereas ones denote “gesture
observed.”
Condition in which gestures initiated
1 2 3 4 Total
Boisfeullet 0 1 0 0 1a
Callie 0 0 0 1 1a
Reba 0 0 0 1 1a
Ossabaw 0 0 0 1 1a
Cheetah 0 0 0 1 1a
Lucy 1 1 0 0 2b b
Carl 0 1 0 1 2b b
Merv 0 1 0 0 1b
Duncan 1 0 0 0 1b
Brodie 0 1 0 0 1b
Ellie 0 0 1 1 2b b
Clint 0 0 0 1 1
Amanda 0 1 0 0 1c
Anna 0 0 0 1 1c
Winston 0 0 0 1 1c
Puddin’ 0 0 0 1 1c
Storer 0 0 0 1 1c
Totals 2 6 1     11     20
These subjects were visible on camera throughout all foura
conditions.
These gestures were recorded on camera.b
These gestures were observed by E2, but not recorded onC
camera.
there were five gestures recorded by E2 (during Conditions 2
and 4) that were not observed on camera, whereas any
gestures exhibited in the absence of an observer and not
recorded on film would not have been available for analysis. 
This constitutes observational bias against the null
hypothesis.  Balanced against this is an observational bias
such that the chimpanzees were visible on camera, on
average, 10 seconds longer when E2 was absent than when E2
was present; this latter constitutes observational bias
against the research hypothesis.  Given these caveats, the
56
chimpanzees in this study did not distribute their gestures
randomly with respect to the four conditions: Cochran’s Q
(3, N = 17) = 13.78, p < .05. Inspection of Table 7 reveals
that the majority of gestures (17 of 20) were initiated in
Conditions 2 and 4.  Nearly twice as many gestures were
initiated in the presence of both food and an experimenter,
compared to when an experimenter, but no food was present(11
and 6, respectively).  Thus, although the presence of food
appears to facilitate gesturing, the presence of food 
(a banana) alone is not a significant factor in the
propensity to exhibit gestural behaviors by chimpanzees.
Additional Results
The effect of the presence of food on the propensity to
vocalize was assessed by comparing vocal behaviors across
Conditions 2 (experimenter present, no food) and 4 (both
food and experimenter present).  Previous research has
established that chimpanzees’ propensity to vocalize is, in 
part, a function of the amount of food presented (e.g.,
Hauser & Wrangham, 1987; Hauser, Teixidor, Field, &
Flaherty, 1993).  The present data presented an opportunity
to partially replicate that finding, as the subjects were
exposed to a change in conditions from one in which there
was no food visible, but an experimenter present (Condition
2) to a condition in which there was both food and an
experimenter present (Condition 4).  Eight subjects
exhibited a change in vocal behavior across the two
conditions.  Of these eight subjects, 1 vocalized in
Condition 2, but not in Condition 4, whereas the remaining 7
subjects did not vocalize in Condition 2 but did vocalize in
57
Condition 4.  Given the previously published reports by
Hauser and his colleagues (Hauser & Wrangham, 1987; Hauser
et al., 1993), justification exists for application of a
one-tailed test.  This would halve the probability
associated with the observed distribution, and using the
binomial test the difference in vocalization as a function
of conditions 2 versus 4 was statistically significant(p =
.035).  Therefore, the findings suggest a facilitatory
effect of food on vocal production in chimpanzees. 
With respect to gaze alternation between the banana and
the experimenter (which could only be assessed in Condition
4), there was a significant association between subjects’
propensity to gesture and to exhibit gaze alternation
between the experimenter and the food (3  (1, N = 35) =2
5.45, p < .05), which is consistent with previous findings
in our laboratory (Leavens & Hopkins, 1998).  Twelve of the
24 subjects who did not gesture in Condition 4 exhibited
gaze alternation between the banana and the experimenter
(50%), whereas ten of the eleven subjects who did gesture in
Condition 4 exhibited concomitant gaze alternation between
the experimenter and the banana (91%).  Thus, the present
data demonstrate an association between visual monitoring
behavior and gestural production in chimpanzees, as reported
in previous studies (Krause & Fouts, 1997; Leavens &
Hopkins, 1998; Leavens et al., 1996).
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENT 2: EFFECTS OF FOOD DISPERSION ON POINTING
The purpose of this experiment was to explore the
effects of a manipulation of food dispersion on the number
of fingers extended by chimpanzees while pointing.  Two
conditions were employed: food was either clustered (2 cm.
between adjacent food items) or relatively spread out (20
cm. between adjacent food items).
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 83 chimpanzees (40 females) housed at the
YRPRC.  All subjects were treated in accordance with the
ethical standards of the American Psychological Association
(American Psychological Association, 1992). 
Materials
Two experimenters participated in each trial.  Each
subject received one each of two trial types (conditions),
in randomized order.  All randomization procedures
throughout this and the following experiment were based on
an application of Fellows’(1967) sequences.  One seedless
grape and 6 peanut kernels were used in each trial.  The
variable being manipulated was food dispersion. In the
present experimental context, the term “dispersion” is used
to refer to the distance between adjacent food items.  Given
a row of seven adjacent food items (see below), when these
food items are placed relatively close together, they are
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considered here to be less dispersed (or spread) than when
seven food items are placed relatively more distantly from
each other.
In 20 cm. trials, the grape and six peanut kernels were
dispersed in a row approximately 35 cm. from the subjects'
cages, parallel with the inside wall of each cage (see
Figure 4).  The food items were placed on a template
constructed from a 1.22 meter length of vinyl baseboard,
with small circles placed at appropriate intervals to guide
food placement (the entire span of the line of food items
was 1.2 meters).  The grape was placed in the center
position and peanuts placed in the other positions on all
trials.  The 2 cm. condition duplicated the 20 cm. condition
in every respect except the interval between food items,
which was 2 cm., forming a line of food items 12 cm. long
(see Figure 4).  A video camera was placed approximately 1.5
meters from the cage, always to the subject's right and
oriented at a 45 degree angle to the cage wall, focused on
the front of the cage.  The videotaped record was used as a
separate record from which reliability estimates were
derived.  All data used for analysis were recorded directly
on data sheets by the second experimenter (see below).
Procedure
Initially, E1 arranged the food items in accordance
with trial type, started the videocamera, then departed
(after discussion with the doctoral committee, for later
trials, the camera was turned on immediately upon the 
arrival of E1, prior to food placement; however, the
rationale for this change in the time at which the 
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Figure 4. The proposed arrangement for Experiment 2. 
Depicted in the top panel is the 20 cm. condition, whereas
the bottom panel depicts the 2 cm. condition.  "S"
represents the subject and "E" the experimenter.  Drawing
not to scale.
videocamera was switched on was obviated when it was decided
to administer a separate experiment to assess audience
effects, which was described above; see Experiment 1).  E2
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subsequently arrived and centered himself on the subject's
cage, facing the subject.  E2 recorded (a) gesture type, if
any, (b) the specific fingers extended when the subject
pointed (as in standard anatomical nomenclature, the thumb
is identified as finger #1, the index finger as finger #2,
etc.), and (c) hand used while gesturing (this last measure
was in support of the study of hand use while gesturing;
these results are not reported here).  For example, if a
subject pointed to the grape with the index finger of the
left hand, this was be recorded as L2; a whole hand point in
the same context was recorded as L1-5.  E2 responded to any
apparent communicative behavior by the chimpanzees
(vocalizations or gestures) by delivering the grape and
ending the trial.  E2 recorded on a data sheet the behavior
he construed as communicative.  Each subject was observed
until he or she exhibited a communicative gesture or until
at least 30 seconds had elapsed since the arrival of the
experimenter.  In other words, all subjects were given at
least 30 seconds to respond.  Trials were terminated upon
response and only those subjects who responded within 30
seconds were included for analysis.  Observation continued
beyond 30 seconds for many subjects, in order to increase
the opportunity for collection of data on hand use, for
another study.  Upon response, the subjects were reinforced
with the grape.  At the conclusion of each trial, E2 turned
off the videocamera.
Behavioral Measures
Behaviors recorded were as listed in Table 5, except
that no attempt was made to differentiate whether gestures
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were object- or person-directed, because of the spatial
contiguity of food and experimenter in this study (see
Figure 4).
Data Analysis
Each subject was categorized as to whether or not they
gestured.  Among those who gestured, those who pointed were
categorized as to whether they exhibited whole-hand or
single-digit pointing (for purposes of this analysis, those
who extended 2 or more fingers were categorized as
exhibiting whole hand points).  The null hypothesis was that
chimpanzees will not become more precise in pointing (i.e.,
will not exhibit proportionately more single-digit points)
as food dispersion decreases; rejecting the null hypothesis
will support the interpretation that their pointing became
either more precise or less precise in structure.  The
McNemar test for symmetry (described in Siegel, 1956, pp.
63-67) was used to analyze results.  In this experimental
context, this test compares the number of individuals who
switch from whole hand points to single-digit points with
the number of individuals who switch from single-digit
points to whole hand points (the McNemar test is insensitive
to responses that do not change across conditions).  Alpha
was set at .05 and the test was two-tailed. 
Reliability
Reliability with respect to gesture type was assessed
with an experimenter reviewing and coding 20% of the
videotaped trials.  Reliability estimates were expressed in
terms of Cohen's kappa, a conservative measure that corrects
for agreement by chance (Bakeman & Gottman, 1986). 
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Interobserver reliability on gesture type was calculated to
be Cohen’s kappa = .81, which is very high.
Results
The overall rate of gestural response was high: 65
chimpanzees gestured during both of the two trials.  Five
subjects gestured in the 2 cm. but not the 20 cm. condition,
and five gestured in the 20 cm. but not the 2 cm. condition. 
Eight subjects did not gesture in either condition.  There
was no influence of trial order (i.e., whether the 2 cm. or
20 cm. condition was presented first): 73 subjects either
gestured or did not gesture on both trials, and the number
of individuals who either (a) gestured in the first trial,
but not the second trial or (b) did not gesture in the first
trial, but gestured in the second trial, was exactly equal
(five in each case).  With respect to pointing,
specifically, twenty-four chimpanzees pointed on both
trials.  Of these only four pointed with the index finger;
thus, too few subjects pointed with the index finger for
statistical analysis.  Of these four, two pointed with the
index finger in the 2 cm. condition and with the whole hand
in the 20 cm. condition and the other two exhibited the
opposite pattern.  The manipulation of food dispersion in




EXPERIMENT 3: EFFECTS OF HIDDEN AND VISIBLE FOOD ON GESTURES
This experiment addressed two questions: (a) do
chimpanzees alter their communicative behaviors in
accordance with whether or not an observer can see the food,




Subjects were 101 chimpanzees (53 females) housed at
the YRPRC.  These chimpanzees had not received language
training.  All subjects were treated in accordance with the
ethical standards of the American Psychological Association
(American Psychological Association, 1992). 
Materials
Two experimenters participated in each trial.  Each
subject received one each of two trial types (conditions),
in randomized order.  Two identical plastic buckets were
inverted and placed approximately 70 cm. from the subjects'
cages, approximately 1.5 meters apart (Figure 5).  Bananas
were used to elicit communicative behaviors.  All trials
were videotaped with a videocamera, as depicted in Figure 5,
to enable the computation of reliability estimates.
Procedure
Experimenter 1 placed a banana either on top of an 
inverted bucket (VISIBLE condition) or beneath an inverted
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Figure 5. Setup for the experiment on the effects of hidden
food on gestural production.  The VISIBLE condition is
depicted, in which a banana was placed on the inverted
bottom of a plastic bucket.  In the HIDDEN condition, a
banana was placed beneath an inverted bucket.  "S"
represents the subject and "E" the experimenter.  Drawing
not to scale.
bucket (HIDDEN condition), according to a randomized 
schedule (Fellows, 1967).  E1 then started the videocamera
and departed.  E1 did not communicate the location of the
banana to E2.  Subsequently (at least 30 seconds later), E2
arrived, centered himself between the buckets and attempted
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to engage the visual attention of the subject by looking at
the subject and calling out the subject’s name. 
As in Experiment 2, described above, in the VISIBLE
condition, E2 responded to any apparent communicative
behavior, as defined in Table 5, by delivering the banana to
the subject and every subject was given at least 30 seconds
to respond.  Although observation continued for more than 30
seconds for some subjects (again, in support of a study of
hand use), only subjects who either (a) responded on camera
within 30 seconds of the arrival of E2 or (b) did not
respond, are included in the following analyses.  Bananas
were delivered upon response or at the termination of the
trial.  In the HIDDEN condition, after establishing a state
of mutual attention with the subject, defined as both
subject and experimenter looking at each other, E2 attempted
to determine which bucket concealed the banana through
interpreting the gestures and postures of the subject.  If
the bucket that E2 checked did conceal the banana, it was
delivered immediately to the subject.  If the bucket did not
conceal the banana, then E2 immediately overturned the
remaining bucket and delivered the banana to the subject. 
If no obvious communicative gesture was exhibited, then
after a minimum interval of 30 seconds after the arrival of
E2, he overturned one or both buckets, delivering the
banana, when found, to the subject.  After delivery of the
banana, E2 turned off the videocamera and departed.
E2  recorded (a) whether or not the subject gestured,
(b) gesture type, (c) whether or not the subject vocalized,
and (d) whether or not the subject looked successively
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between the observer and one or both of the buckets.  The
videotape was coded with respect to the number and type of
gestures.  The videotapes were scored by an experimenter for
reliability estimates.
Data Analysis
Analyses assessed the influence of observer visual
access on the gestural communication of the chimpanzees. 
First, subjects were categorized with respect to whether
they gestured in one condition but not in another.  Second,
subjects were categorized with respect to whether the
orientation of their gestures changed across conditions;
i.e., whether they altered the orientation of their gestures
from being directed toward E2 to being directed toward a
bucket or vice versa.  McNemar’s tests for symmetry was
employed for these analyses and tests were two-tailed. 
 An additional analysis focused on the effectiveness
with which chimpanzees communicated about object location to
E2.  As described in the Method section of Experiment 1,
analyses were also conducted to ascertain whether having the
opportunity to observe others in the tasks had any bearing
on (a) subjects’ efficacy in communicating about hidden
bananas and (b) subjects’ propensity to gesture.
Reliability
In total, there were 202 trials of observation, two
trials for each subject.  Reliability estimates were derived
from comparisons between the original data sheets and a
later viewing of the videotapes.  Because not every subject
stayed within camera view throughout the observation
periods, only a subset of trials were available for
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reliability estimates.  Only trials in which the subject was
visible on the videotaped record from the time E2 arrived to
the time the subject was reinforced were used.  There were
91 trials over both the visible and hidden conditions that
met this criterion; hence, reliability for gesture type was
assessed on 45% of the trials.  Cohen’s kappa for gesture
type was .73, demonstrating high reliability between the
videotaped record and the record created by E2. Reliability
estimates for whether or not gaze alternation or
vocalization occurred were assessed on 42 and 48 trials,
respectively, constituting 21% and 24%, respectively, of the
trials.  Cohen’s kappa for whether or not gaze alternation
was exhibited between the baited bucked and E2 = .82. 
Cohen’s kappa for whether or not subjects vocalized = .75.
Results
Influence of Hiding the Banana
To statistically compare the effects of hiding food,
subjects were selected who met each of two conditions: (a)
that they either gestured within 30 seconds of the arrival
of E2 or did not respond and (b) that they were also
observed during both the visible and hidden conditions. 
Sixty-eight chimpanzees met both criteria.  There was no
influence of test order (i.e., behaviors exhibited on Trial
1 compared to behaviors exhibited on Trial 2) on the
propensity to gesture; that is, 39 subjects gestured on both
trials, 15 subjects gestured on neither trial, seven
subjects gestured on Trial 1, but not on Trial 2, and seven
subjects did not gesture on Trial 1, but gestured on Trial 2
(calculation of a McNemar test in this circumstance is not
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possible, because the numerator, which would be seven minus
seven, is zero).   Fifty-four of these subjects either
gestured in both conditions (visible and hidden banana) or
did not gesture in either condition; 14 gestured in one
condition only.  There was no influence of hiding the food
on subjects’ propensity to gesture (McNemar test, 3 (1, N =2
14) = .07, p > .05).
To check for the possibility that subjects who had
opportunities to see cagemates in the task might gesture
more frequently, the experiments were categorized as
follows: (a) the first Experiment 3 to be administered in a
specific cage (FIRST), (b) the second Experiment 3 to be
administered in a specific cage (SECOND), and (c) the third
through eighth Experiment 3s to be administered in a
specific cage (THIRD).  The number of chimpanzees in each of
these three categories, FIRST, SECOND, and THIRD was 38, 31,
and 32, respectively.  Each experiment comprised two
observations on each of these 101 chimpanzees; thus, there
were 202 observations.  The numbers of observations
attributed to FIRST, SECOND, and THIRD, therefore, were 76,
62, and 64, respectively.  The percent of experiments in
each of FIRST, SECOND, and THIRD in which chimpanzees
gestured at least once (in either the visible or hidden
condition or both) was 84%, 74%, and 66%, respectively. 
Thus, there was no apparent facilitatory effect of observing
the experiments on gestural production.
To statistically compare the direction of gestures
across conditions, the 68 subjects used in the above
analysis were re-categorized as having (a) failed to gesture
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in one or both conditions (n = 28), (b) gestured toward E2
in both conditions or gestured toward a bucket in both
conditions (n = 28; i.e., these subjects exhibited no change
in the direction of their gestures across conditions), (c)
gestured toward E2 in the visible condition and toward a
bucket in the hidden condition (n = 7; i.e., these subjects
increased the specificity of their gestures when the food
was out of view), and (d) gestured toward a bucket in the
visible condition and toward E2 in the hidden condition (n =
5; i.e., these subjects increased the specificity of their
gestures when the food was in plain view).  There was no
influence of hiding the food on the specificity of subjects’
gestures (McNemar test, 3 (1, N = 12) = .08, p > .05).2
There was no influence of test order on the propensity
to vocalize; that is, 15 subjects vocalized on both trials,
39 subjects vocalized on neither trial, four subjects
vocalized on Trial 1, but not on Trial 2, and 10 subjects
did not vocalize on Trial 1, but vocalized on Trial 2
(McNemar’s test 3 (1, N = 14) = 2.57, p > .05).  Fifty-four2
of the subjects either vocalized in both conditions (visible
and hidden banana) or did not vocalize in either condition;
fourteen vocalized in one condition only.  There was no
influence of hiding the food on subjects’ propensity to
vocalize (McNemar test, 3 (1, N = 14) = 0.29, p > .05).2
With respect to gaze alternation between a bucket and
the experimenter, there was no influence of test order on
the propensity to exhibit gaze alternation; that is, 43
subjects exhibited gaze alternation on both trials, three
subjects exhibited gaze alternation on neither trial, 11
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subjects exhibited gaze alternation on Trial 1, but not on
Trial 2, and 11 subjects did not exhibit gaze alternation on
Trial 1, but did so on Trial 2 (calculation of a McNemar
test in this circumstance is not possible, because the
numerator, which would be 11 minus 11, is zero).   There was
no influence of hiding the banana on the propensity to
exhibit gaze alternation between a bucket and the
experimenter (McNemar’s test, 3 (1, N = 22) = 0.18, ns).2
Subjects’ propensity to exhibit gaze alternation was
not associated with their propensity to exhibit
vocalizations in either the visible or hidden conditions
(Visible Condition: 3 (1, N = 68) = 3.27, ns; Hidden2
Condition: 3 (1, N = 68) = 0.10, ns).2
Subjects’ propensity to gesture was also not associated
with their propensity to exhibit vocalizations in either the
visible or hidden conditions (Visible Condition: 3 (1, N =2
68) = 0.40, ns; Hidden Condition: 3 (1, N = 68) = 2.00, ns).2
However, subjects’ propensity to exhibit gestures was
associated with their propensity to exhibit gaze alternation
in both the visible and hidden conditions (Visible
Condition: 3 (1, N = 68) = 5.89, p < .05; Hidden Condition:2
3 (1, N = 68) = 5.41, p < .05).  In the visible condition,2
74% of subjects who gestured also exhibited gaze alternation
between a bucket and E2, and in the hidden condition, 76% of
subjects who gestured exhibited this gaze alternation. 
Among subjects who did not gesture, 40% of subjects
exhibited gaze alternation in the visible condition and 38%
of subjects exhibited gaze alternation in the hidden
condition.
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Effectiveness of Chimpanzee Communication in the Hidden
Condition
This analysis uses data from the hidden condition only
and includes all available subjects.  The experimenters
failed to record whether or not the baited bucket was
selected first by E2 in four cases; hence, only 97 trials
are available for this analysis.  The baited bucket was
selected by E2 on 69 of the 97 trials (71% correct), which
is statistically better than chance (50%), binomial test: Z
= 3.65, p < .001).  Thus, using only first trial data, the
chimpanzees communicated effectively about the location of
the baited bucket.
To assess whether E1 may have unconsciously cued E2 as
to the location of the banana, subjects were categorized
with respect to whether they (a) alternated their gaze 
between the baited bucket and E2, (b) alternated their gaze
between the unbaited bucket and E2, or (c) did not exhibit 
gaze alternation (Figure 6).  The distribution differed
significantly from chance (3  (2, N = 97) = 40.52, p <2
.001).  Examination of Figure 6 reveals that performance in
the absence of gaze alternation is very close to 50%, which 
suggests that E1 did not cue E2 as to the location of the
banana.
This failure to find evidence for inter-experimenter 
cueing of food location is echoed by analysis of the
directions of gestures.  Of the 97 chimpanzees, 88 either
gestured or did not gesture in the hidden condition (the
remainder were such gestures as rump presents and apparent


































































Figure 6. Percent correct as a function of whether subjects
were deemed to (a) exhibit no gaze alternation, (b) gaze
alternation between the observer and the unbaited bucket,
and (c) gaze alternation between the observer and the baited
bucket.
to whether they (a) did not gesture, (b) gestured toward the
unbaited bucket, (c) gestured toward E2, or (d) gestured 
toward the baited bucket.  The distribution differed
significantly from chance ((3  (3, N = 88) = 9.51, p < .05). 2
E2 chose the correct bucket during 100% of the 23 trials in
which subjects gestured toward the baited bucket. When
subjects did not gesture, E2 chose the correct bucket during
60% of the 25 such trials.  When the subjects gestured
toward the unbaited bucket, E2 chose the correct bucket on
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four of six such trials (67%).  Finally, when subjects
gestured toward the experimenter, E2 chose the correct
bucket on 22 of 34 such trials (65%).  Again, performance in
the absence of gestures did not differ substantially from
50%, also suggesting that E1 did not cue E2 as to the
location of the banana.  The relatively high performance in
the presence of those subjects who directed their gestures
towards the unbaited (67%) bucket may be accounted for by
the incongruity between their gaze orienting and gestural
behaviors: five of these six subjects exhibited gaze
orienting behavior successively between the baited bucket
and E2 (the remaining subject exhibited no gaze
alternation).
It was not the case that the first subjects in each
cage exhibited any decrement in performance, relative to
later subjects in a cage.  Subjects were categorized as
being (a) the first subject in a cage to experience the task
(n = 37), (b) the second subject in a cage to experience the
task (n = 30), or (c) the third through eighth subjects in a
cage to experience the task (n = 30); performance was 73%,
73%, and 63%, respectively.  Thus, there was no apparent
facilitatory effect of observing the experiment on the
effectiveness of communication about hidden objects.
Additional Analyses
The influence of observer presence on the propensity to
gesture was assessed.  Only subjects who gestured on camera
within 30 seconds of the arrival of E2 were included.  In
the visible condition, 50 subjects met this criterion and
there was a significant effect of observer presence on the
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emission of gestures (Binomial test, Z = 4.81, p < .0001;
see Figure 7).  In the hidden condition, 51 subjects met the
criterion and there was also a significant effect of
observer presence on the emission of gestures (Binomial
test, Z = 5.60, p < .0001; see Figure 8).  This analysis
demonstrates that the findings in Experiment 1, in which
four conditions were presented in constant order to 35
chimpanzees, cannot be explained by an endogenous
periodicity in the emission of gestures triggered by the
presentation of food (compare Figure 3 with Figures 7 and
8).  Thus, with respect to the time of the arrival of an
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Two conclusions are warranted from the data reported
here: (a) gesturing by chimpanzees is strongly influenced by 
the presence or impending arrival of an audience or observer 
(Experiments 1 and 3) and (b) chimpanzees communicate
effectively about the location of a hidden banana, even on
“first-trial” exposure to the task (Experiment 3).  The
results from Experiment 2, which manipulated the dispersion
of an array of food items indicated that the manipulation of
the amount of spread between food items from 2 cm. to 20 cm.
had no apparent influence on the number of fingers protruded
while pointing in this sample of chimpanzees.
The significance of the audience effect reported here
lies in the sample sizes involved in Experiments 1 and 3. 
Previous reports of the effect of observer presence on
gestures involved relatively small samples, ranging from one
to three subjects (e.g., Call & Tomasello, 1994; Leavens et
al., 1996).  In Experiment 1, 17 chimpanzees gestured and
these gestures were significantly related to the presence of
an observer.  In Experiment 3, 50 chimpanzees gestured
within 30 seconds of the arrival of an observer in the
condition in which a banana was visible to both chimpanzee
and observer.  Also in Experiment 3, 51 chimpanzees gestured
within 30 seconds of the arrival of an observer in the
condition in which a banana was hidden beneath a bucket, so
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that only the chimpanzee knew the location of the banana. 
In both the visible and hidden conditions, chimpanzee
gestures were significantly related to the presence or
impending arrival of the observer.  Thus, the audience
effect on gestures previously reported with relatively small
samples, has been convincingly replicated here three times
with large samples, using only “first-trial” data.
It has been previously argued that, with respect to
whole-hand pointing, the necessity of an audience reflects
that these whole-hand points are communicative in function,
not attempts to grasp obviously out-of-reach food (Leavens &
Hopkins, 1998; Leavens et al., 1996).  The present data, on
the largest samples extant, strongly support this
conclusion.  Chimpanzee gestures require an audience; their
limb and finger extensions are not simply attempts to reach
through the cage mesh to directly grasp obviously
unreachable food.  This does not, of course, demonstrate
that, for example, chimpanzees who do extend limbs and
multiple fingers toward distant food in the presence of an
observer are self-consciously using the limb and hands to
“refer.”   In behavior-analytic terms, the observer might be
termed an “occasion-setting” stimulus for the emission of
gestures (e.g., Mazur, 1994; Rescorla, 1987).
Other than an abstract by Franco and Butterworth
(1990), there are no published studies of the effects of
observer presence on the propensity to gesture in human
infants.  Franco and Butterworth reported a facilitatory
effect of the presence of a caregiver on the propensity to
gesture by human infants as young as 18 months, compared to
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a condition in which caregivers were absent.  A criticism of
that report is that infants who experience the absence of
their caregivers may simply exhibit a generalized behavioral
inhibition due to distress (Franco, personal communication). 
Thus, comparisons between apes and human infants in their
sensitivity to observer presence are obviated by the lack of
data on human infants.  In an ongoing, cross-sectional study
at the University of Sussex (Leavens & Todd, in prep.), the
influence of the presence and degree of visual attention
exhibited by primary caregivers is being manipulated in
groups of 6-, 9-, 12-, 15-, and 18-month-olds to assess
developmental changes in the sensitivity of gestures to the
aspects of caregiver presence and attention, so comparisons
with results from apes will be possible in the near future. 
Preliminary data from that study suggest that parental
attention or the absence thereof has no differential effect
on the propensity of young infants (6 to 9 months of age)to
visually regard an animated mannequin, but that after 12
months of age, infants’ visual regard of an animated
mannequin is facilitated by parental attention, compared to
a condition in which parents are present, but reading a
magazine (i.e., ignoring the infant and the mannequin;
Leavens & Todd, in prep.).
In contrast to the paucity of studies of human infants
in which the effects of observer presence are assessed,
there are many studies of the developmental transition from
pointing without gaze orientation to social partners to
pointing with visual monitoring of social partners (e.g.,
Franco & Butterworth, 1996; Moore & Dunham, 1995).  As noted
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in the introduction (see Figure 1), pointing with
concomitant gaze alternation between the target of a point
and a social partner emerges about 3 months later than
pointing without such visual regard.  A central
methodological limitation of this area of research is that
once pointing begins, visual monitoring of the social
partner is traditionally defined in terms of the latency of
this looking relative to the time of occurrence of the
gesture (specifically, pointing with the index finger). 
When infants look to the social partner within, typically,
two seconds of gesturing, they are categorized as having
exhibited visual checking, otherwise, they are categorized
as not having exhibited visual monitoring of the social
partner (e.g., Franco & Butterworth, 1996).  Thus, the
developing integration of gestural and visual orienting
behavioral systems is currently not well understood.  To
elucidate this development, ongoing research at the
University of Sussex is assessing visual orienting behavior
with respect to an external stimulus (animation of a
mannequin); this research will permit the assessment of
visual orienting behavior throughout the duration of each
experimental trial, so that age-related changes in the
temporal relations between gestures and visual orienting
behaviors can be characterized with reference to an external
stimulus (Leavens & Todd, in prep.). 
For the purposes of the present study, chimpanzees in
the Hidden Condition of Experiment 3 were categorized as
having exhibited (a) gaze alternation between E2 and the
baited bucket, (b) gaze alternation between E2 and the
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unbaited bucket, or (c) no gaze alternation, irrespective of
whether they gestured (Figure 6).  The judgment of E2 as to
the visual orienting behavior of each subject was clearly a
strong factor in E2's choice of bucket to overturn.  When
subjects did not exhibit this successive visual orienting
behavior, E2's ability to choose the baited bucket was at
essentially chance levels, and when the subjects exhibited
gaze alternation between E2 and the unbaited bucket, E2
selected the baited bucket on only 13% of trials, which is
substantially less than chance.  Thus, chimpanzees
communicate effectively about the location of hidden food
even without consideration of their gestural behaviors.  The
data are insufficient to suggest that this gaze behavior is
anything other than a perseverative response, but the
finding substantiates, with a very large sample, Menzel’s
(1973) observation that chimpanzees do not often point
manually because they don’t have to; that is, because
sufficient information is provided by their visual orienting
and postural cues to locate hidden food.
Nevertheless, gestural behavior was a frequent
accompaniment to successive visual orienting between an
observer and hidden food.  Fifty-one chimpanzees in the
Hidden Condition of Experiment 3 gestured within 30 seconds
of the arrival of E2.  Yet the suite of gestures exhibited
did not differ between the conditions in which (a) a banana
was visible to both chimpanzee and experimenter and (b) the
banana was hidden from the experimenter and invisible to the
chimpanzee (who had seen the banana being hidden).  Hiding
the banana had no apparent influence on the propensity to
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gesture, on gesture type, on the propensity to vocalize, or
on the propensity to exhibit gaze alternation between an
observer and the location of a banana.
This finding is in contrast to that reported by O’Neill
(1996) with two-and-a-half-year-old children; the children
exhibited more frequent gestures (mostly pointing) when
their parents had not seen a container being baited than
when the parent had seen this baiting.  The present study
did not have a condition in which E2 had seen a banana being
hidden, so comparisons with O’Neill’s study are tenuous, but
two interpretations of the data seem obvious.  First, it may
be the case simply that chimpanzees do not discriminate
ignorance in social partners and therefore do not take into
account the effects of ignorance on the choice of buckets by
E2.  On the other hand, the task did not require any
additional behavioral response on the part of the
chimpanzees to receive their reward, because all subjects
were given the banana, irrespective of their communicative
behaviors.  Differential reinforcement was employed in
Experiment 3, but it was differential only with respect to
how quickly a given subject received the banana: those who
gestured received the banana immediately, whereas those who
did not gesture did not receive the banana until at least 30
seconds had elapsed.  Given the high level of performance in
choosing the baited bucket (71%), the data suggest that the
hidden banana condition did not sufficiently challenge the
chimpanzees to alter their behavioral repertoires.  The high
performance level is particularly noteworthy because all
subjects were given only one opportunity to respond, which
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is in contrast to the experimental procedure employed by C.
Menzel (1999), in which a single subject was given hundreds
of opportunities to respond.
The procedural features employed in the present
studies, which contrast with other research programs in this
area, are (a) an emphasis on first-trial data, (b) use of
large samples, and (c) relatively naturalistic (in the
context of these subjects’ captive rearing histories)
experimental paradigms.  The advantage to using first-trial
data is that assessment of behavior is relatively free of
interference effects within the context of the studies.  The
primary disadvantage is that control of the behavior is not
demonstrated.  While the experiments reported here do not
significantly advance our understanding of the acquisition
of gestural behaviors in chimpanzees, they demonstrate that
captive chimpanzees exhibit a pronounced audience effect in
their use of gesture.  The large samples employed and the
relatively naturalistic design of the experiments provided
improved external validity compared, for example, to studies
that might bring a behavior or class of behaviors under
greater experimental control.  In other words, these studies
demonstrate that captive chimpanzees exhibit both a
sensitivity to the presence of an observer in the emission
of gestures and the ability to skillfully direct human
observers to the location of hidden food, without any
explicit training whatsoever, and with by far the largest
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c
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p
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c
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p
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b
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c
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i
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c
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1
9
9
4
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h
e
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t
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l
l
e
c
t
e
d
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o
r
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e
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e
n
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e
t
 
a
l
.
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1
9
9
6
)
.
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p
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c
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e
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i
s
 
3
.
2
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=
 
1
.
4
8
;
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
=
 
1
,
 
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
n
u
m
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e
r
 
=
 
6
)
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p
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.
5
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=
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i
n
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u
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u
m
b
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u
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b
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